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I. INTRODUCTION
USC provision § 1782, “Assistance to Foreign and International
Tribunals and to Litigants before such Tribunals,” has received its
fair share of attention in recent years. It has been showcased in
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various scholarly articles,1 disputed in U.S. court decisions,2
conceptually deconstructed through various perspectives,3 and
resorted to in other forums.4 Many of these contributions, however,
have been laced with legal verbiage, paying homage to pro-[court]
litigation ideals and often losing sight of the key advantages and
underlying purposes of international arbitration. We advocate
divergence from this trend by addressing a core outstanding issue of
§ 1782: what is the appropriate method to provide judicial assistance
to international arbitration tribunals regarding matters of discovery?
We contend that U.S. district courts would be better off refraining
from rendering discovery assistance to arbitral tribunals unless they
have first received the arbitral tribunal’s blessing.5 The article and
1. See, e.g., Brandon Hasbrouck, If it Looks Like a Duck . . . : Private
International Arbitral Bodies are Adjudicatory Tribunals Under 28 U.S.C. §
1782(a), 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1659 (2010); Hans Smit, American Assistance
to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of
the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1 (1998); Walter B. Stahr,
Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International Proceedings, 30
VA. J. INT’L L. 597 (1990); Jenna M. Godfrey, Note, Americanization of
Discovery: Why Statutory Interpretation Bars 28 U.S.C. § 1728(a)’s Application in
Private International Arbitration Proceedings, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 475 (2010).
2. See discussion infra Part III.
3. See, e.g., Oliver L. Knöfel, Judicial Assistance in the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Aid of Arbitration: A German Perspective, 5 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 281
(2009); Klaus Reichert, Judicial Assistance in the Taking and Obtaining of
Evidence Abroad in Aid of Arbitration: An Irish Perspective, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 381
(2001); see also Gary B. Born, Court-Ordered Discovery in Aid of a “Foreign”
Arbitration: The U.S. Perspective, 12 ASA BULL. 476 (1994).
4. See, e.g., About OGEMID, TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT., http://www.trans
national-dispute-management.com/ogemid/ (last visited May 14, 2012) (explaining
that OGEMID was “started as a place for discussion, sharing of insights and
intelligence, of relevant issues related in a significant way to international dispute
management,” and providing membership and discussion topic information).
5. See, e.g., Comm. on Int’l Com. Disputes, 28 U.S.C. § 1782 as a Means of
Obtaining Discovery in Aid of International Commercial Arbitration –
Applicability and Best Practices, 63 REC. 752, 753 (2008) (recommending that 28
U.S.C. § 1782 be granted only if the request is by the arbitrator or with the consent
of the arbitrators and proposing that courts consider the source of the request as an
important factor); Daniel J. Rothstein, A Proposal to Clarify U.S. Law on Judicial
Assistance in Taking Evidence for International Arbitration, 19 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 61, 79 (2008) (setting forth various improvements to 28 U.S.C. § 1782
including that parties submit requests for assistance only with arbitrators’ approval
barring an emergency situation); Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the
Proper Interpretation of Section 1782: Its Potential Significance for International
Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 295, 323 (2003) (advocating that federal
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argument is divided into three parts. First, a brief outline of the
legislative history of § 1782 will be provided to demonstrate that a
literal and purposive reading of § 1782 invites an interpretation
consistent with authorizing an international arbitral tribunal
permission-granting status. Second, a review of several U.S. court
cases illustrates that the veritable splatter-shot of judicial decisions
on the matter demand greater consistency as well as improved
respect for international comity and appreciation for the uniqueness
of international arbitration. Third, the paper will look to the Canadian
approach to question whether U.S. district courts can possibly learn
from and improve upon the approach taken by their northern
neighbors.
Before commencing, there are two points that warrant mention.
First, a minority of district courts has determined that international
arbitration is not captured within the § 1782’s textual language of
“foreign or international tribunal.”6 We align ourselves with the
majority of court decisions that regard international arbitral tribunals
as falling within the scope of “foreign or international tribunal.”7
Second, the present study is limited to the application of § 1782 to
international arbitration tribunals only, which may not be applicable
to the reasons for and against the application of the provision to other
“foreign or international tribunals.”

II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The United States has a long history of providing judicial
courts receive “an arbitral directive or request that the information sought be
disclosed” before ordering disclosure by a party in an arbitral proceeding).
6. See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 186 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that the arbitration conducted in Mexico under the auspice of the
International Chamber of Commerce was not a “proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal” pursuant to § 1782); see also Kazakhstan v. Biedermann
Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 881 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that proceedings before the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce fell outside the
phrase “foreign or international tribunal”).
7. See, e.g., In re Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24061 (D. N.J. Apr. 2, 2007) (granting a 28 U.S.C. § 1782 application in aid of an
investor-state arbitration conducted under the US-Kyrgyz Bilateral Investment
Treaty); see also In re Roz Trading, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006)
(granting a 28 U.S.C. § 1782 application in aid of an arbitral panel of the
International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in
Vienna).

872

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:4

assistance to foreign courts.8 Section 1782 did not suddenly appear in
1964 like Minerva springing forth from Jupiter’s head. Instead it was
the gradual “product of congressional efforts, over the span of nearly
150 years.”9 In 1855, Congress passed the first statute allowing U.S.
federal courts to assist foreign courts in obtaining evidence located
within U.S. territory in 1855.10 Subsequently, Congress passed the
Acts of 1863,11 1948,12 and 1949.13
In 1958, Congress, in an effort to facilitate international business
activity, pro-actively established the Commission on International
Rules of Judicial Procedure (“Commission”).14 Congress recognized
the need for statutory improvements in the area of judicial assistance
in order to keep pace with the increased involvement of the United
States in international relations and international litigation.15 The
Commission, directed by Professor Hans Smit, was tasked with
“investigat[ing] and study[ing] existing practices of judicial
assistance and cooperation between the United States and Foreign
8. Cf. Harry Leroy Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural
Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 539–40 (1953) (noting that
the extent of the United States’ cooperation in rendering assistance to foreign
tribunals has been mixed and often “depended upon the nature of the foreign
request,” and whether the request was submitted to a state or federal tribunal).
9. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 247 (2004).
10. See Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855) (“[W]here
letters rogatory shall have [been] addressed, from any court of a foreign country to
any circuit court of the United States, and a United States commissioner designated
by said circuit court to make the examination of witnesses in said letters
mentioned, said commissioner shall be empowered to compel the witnesses to
appear and depose in the same manner as to appear and testify in court.”).
Unfortunately, due to an error, which indexed the 1855 Act under the heading
“Mistrials,” the Act failed to achieve its intended goal of providing judicial
assistance. See Jones, supra note 8, at 540 n.77.
11. Act of March 3, 1863, c 95, §§ 1–4, 12 Stat. 769 (1863). The Act of 1863 is
considered more restrictive than the 1855 Act. Okezie Chukwumerije,
International Judicial Assistance: Revitalizing Section 1782, 37 GEO. WASH. INT’L
L. REV. 649, 655 (2005) (citing various restricting stipulations of the 1863 Act,
including the fact that the “foreign proceedings must relate to the ‘recovery of
money or property,’ the requesting state must be at peace with the United States,
the government of the requesting state must be a party to or have an interest in the
foreign proceedings, and the letter rogatory must have been issued ‘from the court
in which the suit is pending.’”).
12. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (1948).
13. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 93, 63 Stat. 89, 103 (1949).
14. Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743 (1958).
15. S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 2 (1964).
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countries with a view to achieving improvements.”16 In 1963, the
Commission recommended drastic changes to the procedures for
providing international judicial assistance.17
In 1964, Congress, without any revisions, adopted the
Commission’s proposed amendments to § 1782.18 Section 1782, as
now enacted, provides in relevant part:
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found
may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a
document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before
formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory
issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the
application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or
statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a
person appointed by the court.19

Section 1782 permits a district court to grant a petitioner’s request
for judicial assistance if three statutory requirements are met: (1) the
person from whom discovery is sought resides (or is found) in the
district of the district court to which the application is made; (2) the
discovery is for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3)
the application is made by a foreign or international tribunal or any
interested person.
The 1964 amendments clarified and liberalized existing U.S.
procedures for international judicial assistance by enlarging the type
of evidence that could be requested;20 increasing the type of foreign
proceedings that could make a discovery request;21 removing the
16. Id. at 12.
17. See id. at 14-20 (proposing many changes including the omission of several
sections relating to sanctions for perjury and adding a section on service of process
procedures).
18. Act of October 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 9, 78 Stat. 995 (1964).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006) (citing Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869
(1948)) (emphasis added). In 1996, Congress amended § 1782 by adding after the
term “foreign or international tribunal” the language “including criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation.” Id.
20. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 7 (1964) (“U.S. judicial assistance may be
sought not only to compel testimony and statements but also to require the
production of documents and other tangible evidence.”).
21. See id. (noting that “the word ‘tribunal’ is used to make it clear that
assistance is not confined to proceedings before conventional courts”).
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word “pending” from the statute;22 and broadening the scope of
persons who could apply for foreign assistance.23 Moreover, the
amendment provides courts with complete discretion in determining
whether to grant or reject discovery requests, even if all statutory
requirements are met. In exercising this discretionary power, courts
should be mindful of Congress’ stated objectives of the 1964
amendments. These twin aims include: (1) providing liberal and
efficient means of assistance to international litigation24 and (2)
encouraging other countries to provide comparable means of
assistance to U.S. courts.25
As will be discussed in the next section, limiting § 1782 discovery
requests to cases where the tribunal either makes the request or
where the interested party has received the arbitral tribunal’s blessing
is consistent with § 1782’s twin aims.

III.CASE LAW
Receptivity is a concept referring to the degree to which a foreign
tribunal would be disposed to accept and make use of evidence by
means of a discovery process. Receptivity has always been a
consideration in § 1782 interpretation, but it should have always
been a significant factor, rather than being of a host of
considerations. Nevertheless, the factor’s relative degree of influence
on the outcomes of cases has varied. This section provides a review
of § 1782 interpretation and application. It discusses the significance
of the anti-climatic 2004 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Intel v.
AMD as well as the noteworthy cases leading up to and following the
Intel decision. Accordingly, this section consists of three parts: preIntel jurisprudence, the Intel decision itself, and post-Intel
jurisprudence. The aim of this section is to illustrate how the
receptivity factor, despite an apparent lack of emphasis in the case
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (providing that assistance may be granted
“pursuant to a … request made by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the
application of any interested person”).
24. See S. REP. NO. 88-1580, at 2 (1964) (“providing equitable and efficacious
procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with
international aspects”).
25. See id. (“It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in
improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their
procedures.”).
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law, was and ought to be treated as a dominant factor of § 1782
analysis.

A. PRE-INTEL JURISPRUDENCE AND RELIANCE ON THE
RECEPTIVITY FACTOR
As noted, the statutory framework of § 1782 aims to deliver two
functional goals for document discovery: efficiency and international
cooperation. The pre-Intel common law approach of interpreting and
applying the twin aims of § 1782 included consideration of the
receptivity factor.
Regarding the efficiency aim, the case law appears to support a
presumption in favor of granting discovery provided that a petition is
consistent with the purpose of § 1782.26 That presumption, however,
can be rebutted by means of the receptivity factor. In situations
where it would be futile for the district court to exhaust its resources
by approving the petition, the district court should decline § 1782
applications. For example, in the matter of In re Euromepa27 the
appellate court determined that discovery should be informed by the
§ 1782 twin aims unless it is demonstrated that the foreign tribunal
would reject the discovered evidence.28 In Re Bayer29 the district
court expanded on this principle. The district court explained that the
burden of proof against a discovery application, particularly “the
burden of demonstrating offense to the foreign jurisdiction, [rests
with] the party opposing the application.”30 Specifically, the district
court wrote: “courts should treat relevant discovery materials sought
pursuant to § 1782 as discoverable unless the party opposing the
application can demonstrate facts sufficient to justify the denial of
the application.”31
Regarding the international cooperation aim, respect for and
deference to a foreign jurisdiction and its legal system are defining
considerations of pre-Intel jurisprudence. For example, in deciding In
26. See In re Euromepa S.A., 51 F.3d 1095, 1097 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that
Congress created section 1782 to generally function as a “one-way street” to
encourage other countries to also offer assistance liberally).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1098.
29. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998).
30. Id. at 196.
31. Id. at 195.
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re Aldunate,32 the district court, while granting the § 1782
application, questioned whether § 1782 discovery would circumvent
Chilean law or act as affront to Chilean sovereignty. The district
court’s motivation was premised on the twin aims of § 1782, which
culminated in its decision being premised on the promotion of
international comity.33 In the case of In re Schmitz34 the district court
applied the same reasoning but reached the opposite result. In that
case, petitioners sought documents from a German company in
connection to a pending securities class action suit. German
authorities specifically requested that the discovery not be provided
because the discovery might jeopardize an ongoing criminal
investigation. The district court held that the purpose of § 1782
would be undermined if it did not acknowledge the sovereignty
concerns attached to the petitioners’ application and thus relied on
international comity to deny the application.35
The thread that ties these cases together is that each case suggests
that a dialogue or, at the very least, mutual respect and understanding
is required between the district court and the foreign legal system.
The Euromepa and Bayer cases indicate that the district court ought
to apprehend confirmation that a foreign tribunal will admit, or at the
very least not reject, the discovered evidence prior to granting § 1782
applications.36 Similarly, the Aldunate and Schmitz matters confirm
that the district court must account for the particulars of a foreign
legal order before proceeding with § 1782 petitions. 37
Indeed, a number of pre-Intel district courts explicitly recognize
that obtaining the permission of a foreign tribunal before entertaining
32. In re Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993).
33. Id. at 61-62 (holding that the U.S. court did not abuse its discretion because
the it made an inquiry into whether its grant of discovery would offend Chilean
law).
34. In re Schmitz, 259 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
35. Id. at 298.
36. See Deborah C. Sun, Note, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.:
Putting “Foreign” Back into the Foreign Discovery Statute, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 279, 286–87 (2005) (stating that the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have
refused to read a foreign discoverability requirement into the statute because the
plain language and legislative history do not require it).
37. See Smit, supra note 5, at 315 n.45 (referring to several cases that stand for
the proposition that there is an unofficial requirement of discoverability or
admissibility under foreign or international law including the Aldunate and Schmitz
cases).
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a discovery application achieves the twin aims of § 1782. For
example, In re Nedenes District Court (Norway)38 a Norwegian court
sought judicial assistance in connection with a paternity proceeding
and requested pursuant to § 1782 to compel the respondent to
provide a blood sample. In granting the request, the Southern District
Court of New York reasoned that the “Norwegian Court specifically
requested the assistance of this Court: accordingly, there [are] no
Norwegian sovereignty concerns that could hinder that court’s
efforts” and that granting the motion would “efficiently assist a
request made by the Norwegian Court and would encourage Norway
to provide similar assistance to our courts.”39 The district court in In
re Technostroyexport40 applied the same reasoning but rendered a
different result. In that case, Technostroy applied for § 1782
discovery to aid an arbitration proceeding pending in Moscow and
Stockholm. In denying the application, the district court stated that:
Technostroy . . . made no effort to obtain any ruling from the arbitrators.
It has come directly to the Federal District Court. The court concludes
that, under these circumstances, it would be improper to order the
discovery requested. . . . [If] Technostroy had obtained a ruling from a
foreign arbitrator [first], the court would be empowered under §1782 to
enforce that ruling in the United Sates.41

The district court’s subsequent comments, which acknowledge
that arbitration rules and procedures are radically different than the
procedure and rules of the courts, are further indications that a
significant degree of deference ought to be afforded to foreign
jurisdictions, particularly those that have different or special rules
that ought to be preserved.42

B. INTEL V AMD: MISSED OPPORTUNITY?
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court, for the first time, interpreted §
1782 in Intel v. AMD.43 The Intel case originated from AMD’s
38. In re Letter Rogatory From the Nedenes Dist. Ct., Nor., 216 F.R.D. 277
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
39. Id. at 279.
40. In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
41. Id. at 697.
42. Id.
43. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004). The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the European Commission was a tribunal within the
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antitrust claims against Intel before the European Commission.44 This
case is significant because it simultaneously cleared up and clouded
the application of § 1782. On the one hand, the Intel decision is
helpful because it provided an analytical method of applying § 1782.
On the other hand, that analytical framework undermines the purpose
of § 1782 by restricting the role of the receptivity factor. Four
findings of the Supreme Court warrant discussion because of their
impact on the receptivity principle of § 1782.
First, the Supreme Court in emphasizing that discovery pursuant §
1782 is discretionary relegated receptivity as one of many factors for
the district court to consider.45 Alongside receptiveness, the district
courts may consider: (1) whether the person from whom discovery is
sought is a party in the foreign proceedings and subject to the
jurisdiction of the foreign tribunal; (2) nature of the foreign tribunal;
(3) whether the request attempts to circumvent foreign proofgathering restrictions; and (4) whether the request is unduly intrusive
or burdensome.46
Second, the Supreme Court offered no guidance on the weight that
should attach to the receptivity factor or how district courts should
apply it.47 As discussed below, failure to give direction to district
meaning of § 1782 because it was an investigative body reviewable by European
Courts, it made dispositive rulings, and it was a first instance decision maker.
While the case did not directly concern an arbitration proceeding, future cases have
relied on the Supreme Court’s dicta to extend application of § 1782 to assist
arbitral proceedings. Specifically, district courts have relied on the Supreme
Court’s mention of an article written by Professor Hans Smit, the principal drafter
of § 1782, which defined “tribunal” as including “arbitral tribunals” to justify such
wide interpretation. Id. at 257-59.
44. See id. at 246-52. AMD’s complaint asserted that Intel violated European
competition law in several ways including that it abused its dominant position in
the market through loyalty rebates, price discrimination, and exclusive agreements
with retailers. To support its claim, Respondent AMD sought to invoke 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a) for an order to require petitioner Intel to produce documents from a prior
antitrust suit Intel was involved in on file in the federal court in Alabama. The
District Court denied AMD’s application, finding that Section 1782 did not apply
to this type of discovery. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then reversed
and remanded, directing the District Court to rule on the merits. The Supreme
Court agreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that the District Court had
authority to require the discovery under Section 1782. Id.
45. Id. at 264-65.
46. Id.
47. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 265 (2004)
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courts has led to inconsistent applications of the receptivity factor.
Third, the receptivity factor was further weakened when the
Supreme Court completely ignored the European Commission’s
explicit wishes expressed in its amicus curiae brief “that it does not
need or want the district court’s assistance.”48 Interestingly, the
Supreme Court reasoned that it was unclear whether the
Commission’s views were shared by similarly situated entities in the
international community.49 Why the Supreme Court expected the
Commission to speak for all comparable international bodies is
unclear.50
Fourth, the Supreme Court’s holding that § 1782 does not require
adjudicative proceedings to be pending, but only that proceedings
must be within reasonable contemplation, again undercuts the
receptivity factor, thereby undercutting the very autonomy of the
body purportedly in need of “judicial” assistance.51

C. POST-INTEL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE RECEPTIVITY FACTOR
The Supreme Court in Intel missed a viable opportunity to
improve the significance of the receptivity factor. By de-emphasizing
the factor’s importance within § 1782, the Intel decision essentially
undermined the twin aims of the provision and has left future cases
in a state of confusion. The resulting effect has led to several
different understandings regarding the role that the receptivity factor
plays in the interpretation and application of § 1782.

(mentioning that the Court will not adopt supervisory rules and that more guidance
on how to apply section 1782 should await further experience with its application
in the lower courts).
48. See Smit, supra note 5, at 331-32 (suggesting that the Commission may
have overstepped its boundaries when it attempted to provide its own interpretation
of U.S. law). Specifically, the Commission argued that it was not a “foreign or
international tribunal” within the meaning of § 1782. As Smit explains, “the
Commission would have done better to defer to the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of United States law” and instead merely informed “the Supreme Court that it
preferred that the assistance be denied.” Id.
49. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 265-66.
50. For criticism of the Supreme Court on this point, see Sun, supra note 36, at
295.
51. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 259 (rejecting the Second Circuit’s view that
section 1782 only applies to proceedings that are pending or imminent; holding
instead simply that the evidence eventually be used in a proceeding).
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It is prudent to note that the majority of the post-Intel 1782 cases
have arisen out of a singular dispute between a U.S. company,
Texaco (now owned by Chevron), and the Republic of Ecuador.
Since 2004, the long-running litigation between Chevron and
Ecuador developed into three separate proceedings – civil, criminal
and international arbitration – all foreign to U.S. jurisdiction.52 As a
result of the pending trial, litigation and arbitration, Chevron and
more recently Ecuador filed a number of § 1782 requests before
several different district courts seeking discovery from various third
parties.53 The § 1782 jurisprudence resulting from the Chevron and
Ecuador dispute is significant because it demonstrates that most of
the post-Intel § 1782 cases involved the same parties and aimed to
discover evidence to assist the same three pending cases, but that the
relative weight these courts place on the receptivity factor has varied
considerably. Ostensibly, there are three positions that district courts
have taken when applying the receptivity factor: ambivalent,
restrictive and cautionary.
The minority position of post-Intel § 1782 decisions is
52. See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The
Chevron and Ecuador dispute dates back to 1964, when TexPet, a Texaco
subsidiary, began oil exploration and drilling in Ecuador. In 1993, a group of
Ecuadorian nationals filed a class action lawsuit against Texaco in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking damages for
environmental contamination caused by Texaco (“Aguindo suit”). At issue in that
dispute was whether TexPet polluted the environment and caused health and social
harms in the Amazon region of Ecuador. Shortly after the suit was raised, Texaco
entered into a settlement agreement with Ecuador in which Ecuador promised to
release its claims against Texaco if it performed certain environmental remediation
work. By 2003, the Aguindo suit was dismissed due to forum non conviens. Id. at
554. In the same year, however, the same plaintiffs raised a new suit in a small
Ecuadorian township of Lago Agrio, claiming $27 billion against Chevron, which
had merged with Texaco in 2001 (“Lago Argrio litigation”). Likely in anticipation
of an unfavorable outcome, in 2009, Chevron brought an investor-state arbitration
under the UNCITRAL arbitration rules claiming several violations of the U.S.Ecuador BIT, including allegations of fraud during the Ecuador prosecution of the
Lago Agrio litigation. In February 2011, the Ecuadoran court ordered Chevron to
pay $8 billion in damages. See Chevron Ordered to Pay $8 billion by Ecuador
Court, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/14/
business/la-fi-chevron-20110214.
53. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 236 n.7 (2d Cir. 2012)
(stating that Chevron has commenced dozens of discovery proceedings under
section 1782, describing the phenomenon as “unique,” and noting that Ecuador
initiated a proceeding under section 1782 in late 2011).
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ambivalence. These decisions appear to completely disregard the
receptivity factor altogether and make no mention of whether a
foreign tribunal ought to be receptive to the discovered evidence.54
Regarding the restrictive position, some courts appear to align
their reasoning with the Intel decision by minimizing the factor’s role
in determining whether to grant discovery.55 The Northern District
Court of Georgia determined, through In re Chevron, that a district
court may properly grant § 1782 requests “even if the specific panel
deciding the underlying dispute would not order similar discovery or
ultimately decides not to accept the specific discovery ordered by
this Court.”56 Similarly, In re Chevron57 the Southern District Court
of New York noted that knowing the foreign court’s views regarding
whether the discovered evidence would be admitted would be helpful
but was not dispositive.58 Naked assurances of disputed receptivity
were also insufficient to dismiss an application In re Application of
Chevron.59 In that case, Ecuador asserted that its civil court would
not be receptive to certain requested documents because it already
denied discovery of those same documents.60 Chevron, however,
insisted that their requests had not been denied by the Ecuadorian
court.61 The appellate court concluded that “the status of Chevron’s
requests is not clear from the record”62 and, despite that uncertainty,
granted the § 1782 application.
A number of district courts have also relied on the previous
Chevron and Ecuador § 1782 jurisprudence as evidence indicating
that the Ecuadorian courts and international arbitration are receptive

54. See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 300 (2d Cir. 2011)
(holding that a creator of a documentary film did not independently solicit and
collect the participants’ stories, and thus, was not entitled to withhold footage
requested pursuant to section 1782 because the footage was not privileged).
55. In re Chevron Corp., No. 1:10-MI-00076-WT-GGB, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 114724 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2010).
56. Id. at *11 (citing In re ROZ Trading Ltd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2212, at
*7).
57. In re Chevron Corp., No. M-19-111, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47034
(S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2010).
58. See id. at *21.
59. See In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2011).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 163.
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to third party evidence discovery.63 The District of Columbia Court
In re Veiga explains that absent authoritative proof from the foreign
courts or international arbitration suggesting otherwise, evidence
ought to be discovered because “[t]hose tribunals may simply choose
to exclude or disregard the information obtained should they find that
this Court has overstepped in ordering discovery.”64 Similarly, In re
Republic of Ecuador and Dr. Diego Garcia Carrion,65 an Ecuadoran
application, the district court reasoned that receptivity was either
implicit or explicitly asserted because Chevron had itself sought and
was awarded extensive § 1782 applications.66 This position, of
course, assumes that receptivity was properly considered in the cases
relied upon. Reliance on previous decisions as an indication of future
evidence admission by a foreign tribunal is faulty because each §
1782 application uncovers new evidence. Thus, each application
ought to be treated as unique and considered on its own merits.
Regarding the cautionary position, other courts appear to
contradict the Intel reasoning by favoring the receptivity factor as a
prominent consideration of § 1782 applications. In re Babcock,67 the
district court regarded the receptivity of the foreign tribunal as
“particularly important in light of the purposes of §1782” and
acknowledged that “if there is reliable evidence that the foreign
tribunal would not make any use of the requested material, it may be
irresponsible for a district court to order discovery, especially where
it involves substantial costs to the parties involved.”68 Babcock also
suggests that the burden of proof may not only fall solely on the
respondent’s shoulders and instead it is up to both parties to
demonstrate “authoritative proof” that the foreign tribunal would be
receptive to the discovery materials requested.69

63. See, e.g., In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2010); In re Ecuador, No.
C 11-80171 CRB, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108612 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2011); In re
Chevron, Nos. 10-MC-208, 10-MC-209, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134970 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 20, 2010).
64. In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d at *24.
65. In re Ecuador, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 108612.
66. See In re Ecuador, 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 108612 at *11-12 (concluding that
the receptivity factor was “either neutral or slightly favors the Applicants”).
67. In re Babcock Borsig AG, 583 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D. Mass. 2008).
68. Id. at 241.
69. Id.
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Similarly, the Finserve Group70 decision professes a cautionary
approach in light of the receptivity factor. In In re Finserve the
district court denied Finserve’s § 1782 petition because it had only
expressed an intention to arbitrate and had not finalized the
arbitration application process.71 In short, the district court was not
prepared to permit discovery if it could not first be determined that
the foreign arbitral tribunal would be receptive to such discovery.
Specifically, the district court concluded “this Court has been
presented with no indication as to the ‘receptivity of the foreign
government or the court or agency abroad to the United States
federal court assistance.’”72
Another decision that emphasized a greater need for caution and
the receptivity factor, In re Chevron, was issued by the District Court
of Massachusetts.73 In that case, the district court was willing to grant
discovery for the pending Ecuadorian civil and criminal cases but
was unwilling to permit the § 1782 petition for the UNCITRAL case.
The district court concluded that it was “not convinced that, given its
nature, the Treaty Arbitration tribunal is at all receptive to or in need
of this court’s assistance with regard to the particular discovery
sought here” and that “since international arbitrators usually control
the discovery process, this court believes it should exercise at least
some restraint.”74

IV. LOOK NORTH: CANADA
In Canada, letters of request or letters rogatory are authorized
under the Canadian Evidence Act and/or analogous provincial
evidence acts. An application is brought before a superior court on
notice to those affected by the letter of request. There are minor
variations between the Canadian Evidence Act and the provincial
equivalents. However, there are generally three basic jurisdictional
requirements for enforcement in Canada: (1) that the evidence is
sought by a ‘court or tribunal’ outside of Canada for use in a civil,
commercial or criminal matter; (2) the evidence must be for a
70. In re Finserve Group, No 4:11-mc-2044-RBH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
121521 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2011).
71. See id. at *2.
72. Id. at *9-10.
73. In re Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242 (D. Mass. 2010).
74. Id. at 250-51.
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purpose for which letters of request could be issued under the rules
of the Canadian court; and (2) the evidence sought must be within
the jurisdiction of the Canadian Court.
Section 46(1) of the Canada Evidence Act provides the following:
46. (1) If, on an application for that purpose, it is made to appear to any
court or judge that any court or tribunal outside Canada, before which
any civil, commercial or criminal matter is pending, is desirous of
obtaining the testimony in relation to that matter of a party or witness
within the jurisdiction of the first mentioned court, of the court to which
the judge belongs or of the judge, the court or judge may, in its or their
discretion, order the examination on oath on interrogatories, or
otherwise, before any person or persons named in the order, of that party
or witness accordingly, and by the same or any subsequent order may
command the attendance of that party or witness for the purpose of being
examined, and for the production of any writings or other documents
mentioned in the order and of any other writings or documents relating to
the matter in question that are in the possession or power of that party or
witness.75

Unlike in the United States, Canadian courts have had far less of
an opportunity to analyze whether letters rogatory or letters request
issued by parties to private arbitral proceedings should be enforced.
Likewise, there has been far less academic attention paid to the
enforcement of letters rogatory by Canadian courts76 and even less
attention to whether international arbitral tribunals fall within the
provincial or federal statutory scope of “court or tribunal of
competent jurisdiction.”77 While it seems clear that a Canadian court
will enforce a request if the arbitration tribunal directly invokes the
assistance of a foreign court,78 it is less clear whether such a court
75. Canada Evidence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5, s. 46(1) (emphasis added); see
also Alberta Evidence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-18, s. 56(1); Ontario Evidence Act,
R.S.O. 1990, c. E-23, s. 60(1).
76. See, e.g., Bradley J. Freedman & Gregory N. Harney, Obtaining Evidence
from Canada: The Enforcement of Letters Rogatory by Canadian Courts, 21 U.
BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 351 (1987).
77. Michael Penny, Letters of Request: Will a Canadian Court Enforce a Letter
of Request from an International Arbitral Tribunal?, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 249
(2001); see also W. Donald Goodfellow & Barbara E. Cotton, Enforcement of
Letters Rogatory Issued by a Foreign Arbitration Tribunal, 30 ADVOC. Q. 316
(2005).
78. See, e.g., Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. v. Legacy Hotels Real Estate Inv. Trust,
2003 CanLII 25063 (Can. O.N. S.C.) (enforcing two letters rogatory issued by the
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will enforce the letters rogatory emanating directly from a foreign
arbitral tribunal. This section will review the Canadian approach to
discovery requests from foreign arbitral tribunals with particular
focus on its treatment of the receptivity factor.

A. MCCARTHY BARRIERS
In earlier cases, starting with the McCarthy Ontario Court of
Appeal decision in 1963, the Canadian approach to enforcing letters
of request can be characterized as cautious and conservative.79 In
McCarthy, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
made an application under the Ontario Evidence Act and Canadian
Evidence Act for aid to compel attendance of witnesses within
Ontario to give evidence under oath for use in proceeding before the
SEC.80
When deciding whether to enforce a letter of request by a foreign
tribunal, the Court of Appeal stressed that “[i]t is important to
consider the nature, status and powers of the respondent.”81 To
accomplish this task, Aylesworth JA established three basic factors,
which should govern the granting of an order under either the
Ontario Evidence Act or the Canada Evidence Act:
The foreign tribunal must have the power under its enabling statutes and
rules to direct the taking of depositions outside of its jurisdiction;
There must be “reciprocity” between the court and the foreign tribunal;
and
The foreign tribunal must have the well-known sanctions of a court of law
or equity with which it is able to enforce its duly authorized orders.82

Based on these factors, Aylesworth JA refused to enforce the
letters of request. In coming to this conclusion, Aylesworth made the
following observations with regard to the Evidence Acts:

Superior Court of Washington on behalf of an ongoing arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association in Washington).
79. McCarthy v. Menin, [1963] 2 O.R. 154 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
80. See id. paras. 2-4.
81. Id. para. 5.
82. See United States v. A.G. Becker Inc., [1984] O.J. 479, para. 5 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.).
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The legislation is designed to provide as a matter of international courtesy
or comity for the taking of evidence of persons within the jurisdiction of
our Courts in aid of foreign Courts and inherent I think, in the idea of
international courtesy or comity is a mutuality of purpose and of
powers.83

This passage seems to import the concept of judicial reciprocity
into the notion of international comity. Consequently, the SEC
lacked such powers, specifically the ability to enforce a letter of
request emanating from a Canadian court, and thus there was no
mutuality of purpose or reciprocity between Ontario Courts and the
SEC.
McCarthy was subsequently followed by the Ontario High Court
of Justice in Becker.84 This case similarly dealt with whether to
enforce letters rogatory issued by the SEC. The Ontario Court began
its analysis by summarizing the three McCarthy principles.85 While
the Court recognized that the U.S. Congress in 1964, a year after the
McCarthy decision was rendered, amended its enabling legislation to
give the Department of State the power to receive or issue letters
rogatory, the Court was unconvinced that the Charter of the SEC had
changed enough to meet the other two requirements (mutuality of
purpose and sanctions of a court of law or equity).86 In a somewhat
apologetic conclusion, the Court stated:
But for the decision of the Court of Appeal on McCarthy v Menin, supra,
I would be inclined to give the words “court or tribunal of competent
jurisdiction” a fairly broad interpretation and to hold that the Commission,
in this case, was a tribunal of competent jurisdiction.87

More recently, in BF Jones, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
refused to enforce a letter of request from a private arbitrator in
Florida.88 In rejecting the order, the Superior Court highlighted one
83. McCarthy, 2 O.R. para. 10.
84. See A.G. Becker, [1984] O.J. paras. 4, 7. For other cases that followed
McCarthy, see, for example, United States v. Executive Securities Corp., [1977] 15
O.R. 2d 790 (Can. Ont. High Ct. J.); Ontario (Securities Commission) v. Bennett,
[1991] 1 O.R. 3d 576 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
85. See A.G. Becker, [1984] O.J. para. 5.
86. See id. para. 7.
87. Id.
88. See B.F. Jones Logistics Inc. v. Rolko, [2004] 72 O.R. 3d 355 (Can. Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.).
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of the McCarthy factors, namely that the private arbitral tribunal
governed by the Commercial Dispute Resolution Procedures of the
American Arbitration Association lacked the authority to issue letters
of request and, in fact, the arbitral tribunal only had the authority to
“allow for the issuance of subpoenas.”89 The Court accepted
McCarthy’s purpose beyond the Evidence Act providing that
“[i]nternational comity between friendly nations is the rationale for
the existence of the power to order the taking of commission
evidence. Reciprocity is a manifestation of that comity.”90 Because
the Florida arbitration lacked the ability to reciprocate a request, the
application before the Ontario court was denied. The court
recommended that the ‘proper procedure’ would be for the arbitral
tribunal “to seek the assistance of a Florida court to issue a Letter of
Request to this court.”91
In all three cases, McCarthy, Becker and BF Jones, the Ontario
courts rejected the applications to enforce a letter of request and in
all three cases the requests emanated directly from the foreign
arbitral tribunal or commission. Instead of considering the receptivity
of the foreign tribunal, which should have weighed in favor of
granting the request, the Ontario courts focused on the alleged
inability of the tribunal to reciprocate requests. In both McCarthy
and BF Jones the courts effectively conflated reciprocity with the
notion of international comity. In doing so, these courts seemed
much more concerned about the structure of the body making the
request (e.g. nature, status and powers) and how closely it resembled
a traditional court rather than the source of the request.

B. R V ZINGRE: COMITY OVERTAKES RECIPROCITY
In the 1980s, Canadian courts began moving away from the
McCarthy principles, emphasizing instead the importance of
international comity in deciding whether to provide judicial
assistance. Although comity is somewhat of an elusive term, the
Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has made a number of helpful
contributions that help shape its boundaries. Laskin CJC in Royal

89. Id. para. 12.
90. Id. para. 15 (quoting France v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can. Ltd., [1991] 3
O.R. 3d 705, 713 (Can. Ont. C.A.)).
91. Id. para. 16.
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American Shows, for example, opined that “comity dictates that a
liberal approach should be taken with requests for judicial assistance,
so long at least as there is more than ephemeral anchorage in our
legislation to support them.”92 Similarly, La Forest in Morguard,
adopting the formulation of the US Supreme Court, stated:
“Comity” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation on
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
to both international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its law.93

One of the most important cases that dealt specifically with
whether to enforce a letter of request is R v. Zingre.94 While the case
did not address whether international arbitral tribunals fall within the
scope of the Evidence Act, it is important because it demonstrates the
Canadian trend of emphasizing international comity over
reciprocity.95 In Zingre, the SCC questioned “the right of a Manitoba
Court to issue a commission authorizing two Swiss ‘extraordinary
investigating judges’ to take testimony in Canada.”96 The testimony
was “in respect of the prosecution in Switzerland of three Swiss
nationals for crimes allegedly committed in Manitoba.”97 The
investigating judges were tasked with “[examining various]
documents and [interrogating] witnesses [for the purpose of]
determining whether the evidence justified a formal trial” in
Switzerland.98
Dickson J, speaking for the majority, articulated the underlying
purpose of § 46 of the Canada Evidence Act:
It is upon this comity of nations that international legal assistance rests.
Thus the Courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial
decisions of another jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of
92. United States Dist. Ct., M.D. Fla. v. Royal American Shows Inc., [1982] 1
S.C.R. 414, 421 (Can.).
93. Morguard Inv. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, para. 31 (citing
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)).
94. See Zingre v. R., [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392 (Can.).
95. See generally Penny, supra note 77; Goodfellow & Cotton, supra note 77.
96. Zingre, 2. S.C.R. para. 1.
97. Id.
98. Id. para. 10.
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mutual deference and respect. A foreign request is given full force and
effect unless it be contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction to which
the request is directed or otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty or the
citizens of the latter jurisdiction.99

Zingre introduced a presumption in favor of enforcing letters
rogatory issued by a foreign tribunal unless it is contrary to public
policy or it hinders the sovereignty of Canada. This approach was
subsequently followed in France (Republic) v De Havilland Aircraft
of Canada Ltd where the First Examining Magistrate of the High
Court of Grasse made an application to an Ontario court for judicial
assistance.100 The Ontario Court of Appeal enforced the letter of
rogatory even though there was no reciprocity from the French
court.101 In coming to this conclusion, Doherty JA explicitly rejected
reciprocity as a precondition for enforcement of letters rogatory and
stated:
It is inappropriate to limit considerations of reciprocity to the powers of a
particular court or tribunal. Rather, the question must be, is there a
mechanism in place within the foreign jurisdiction which could respond
favourably to a Canadian request by way of letters rogatory.102

In other words, as long as a mechanism exists “within the foreign
jurisdiction which could respond favourably to a Canadian request
by way of letters rogatory” then the court should be inclined to
enforce the letter.103 Instead of inviting the tribunals to apply directly
to the U.S. courts first for letters rogatory, the De Havilland case
destroyed the need for the middleman. Moreover, the court warned
that to require reciprocity “as a condition precedent” to the
enforcement of letters of request would “undermine the goals of
international cooperation which underlie the power to order the
taking of commission evidence.”104 Therefore, De Havilland
successfully separated reciprocity from international comity.

99. Id. para. 18. For other articulations by the SCC on the principle of comity,
see, for example, Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022 (Can.).
100. See France v. De Havilland Aircraft of Can. Ltd., [1991] 3 O.R. 3d 705,
707 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 714.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Maintaining receptivity as the governing factor under § 1782
applications not only furthers the twin aims of the statute, including
the fostering of international comity. It also quells some of the
concerns made by the earlier U.S. district courts which rejected §
1782 applications. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Biedermann
warned of the potential consequences of extending § 1782 requests to
arbitral tribunals:
Empowering arbitrators or worse, the parties, in private international
disputes to seek ancillary discovery through the federal courts does not
benefit the arbitration process. Arbitration is intended as a speedy,
economical, and effective means of dispute resolution. The course of the
litigation before us suggests that arbitration’s principal advantages may be
destroyed if the parties succumb to fighting over burdensome discovery
requests far from the place of arbitration.105

Maintaining judicial restraint until, and unless, the tribunal has
given its blessing will help protect international arbitration as a
“speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute resolution.”106
Receptivity, however, requires two-way participation. On the one
hand, U.S. district courts must ensure that the tribunal approves the
request. This approach not only respects the autonomy of the arbitral
tribunal and recognizes its ability to regulate the arbitral procedure; it
also prevents “inefficient and wasteful situations” in cases where the
tribunal rejects the evidence.107 U.S. courts could learn from recent
Canadian trends, transitioning from a reciprocity focused analysis to
a more receptive orientated approach that augments international
comity as a primary criterion. As BF Jones is a 2004 decision that
contradicts the Canadian movement, U.S. district courts have the
opportunity to settle this transnational matter by ensuring that a
foreign tribunals blessing is granted prior to approving a § 1782
document discovery request.
On the other hand, arbitral tribunals must be prepared to explicitly
approve or disapprove of the § 1782 application. It does not just
remain with the district courts to act in a consistent manner; tribunals
105. Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int’l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999).
106. Id.
107. Comm. on Int’l Com. Disputes, supra note 5, at 778.
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must be prepared to resist the temptation to remain silent. For
example, in Methanex v. United States, the investor sought the
approval of the NAFTA tribunal to make two § 1782 applications.108
In response, the NAFTA tribunal stated that it would not bless nor
would it oppose the Methanex’s proposed applications under §
1782.109 Even though the tribunal voiced its concerns with regard to
the timeliness of the proposed applications, the tribunal nonetheless
maintained that Methanex was “at liberty to make any such
applications at any time.”110 Although Methanex withdrew its § 1782
applications before the district courts could make a determination,
the tribunal’s ambivalence towards the application is very
unhelpful.111 For § 1782 to be successful in aiding rather than
hampering international arbitration, respect must run both ways. If
arbitral tribunals expect respect, they are going to have to be willing
to demonstrate it.

108. See Methanex Corp. v. United States, OXFORD REP. INT’L INV. CLAIMS 167
(2005) (Rowley et al., Arbs.).
109. See id. para. 21.
110. Id.
111. For an analysis of Methanex’s § 1782 application, see generally Timothy
G. Nelson, Can Parties to a NAFTA Arbitration Get Discovery From U.S. Courts
under 28 U.S.C. § 1782? The Methanex Question Revisited, 26 MEALEY’S INT’L
ARB. REP. 15 (2011).

